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Supply the Hand that Feeds: Narcotic
Detection Dogs and the Fourth Amendment
MEGAN YENTES*
Police canines are highly valued by law enforcement agencies as they
are capable of detecting the faintest scent of contraband. The Supreme Court
has established that a canine sniff is not a “search” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and as long as a canine has been formally trained
by any “bona fide” organization, their positive alert provides law enforcement officials with the requisite probable cause to institute warrantless and
invasive searches of automobiles. The Supreme Court’s flawed approach was
best summed up by Justice Souter when he stated, “The infallible dog, how0
ever, is a creature of legal fiction.” The Supreme Court’s approach to canine
sniffs has overlooked underwhelming canine accuracy rates, as well as the
lack of federal or state standards imposed on training facilities. These underlying concerns surrounding canine sniffs have been unheeded by the Supreme Court, and thus, an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections have
become further diluted. This Note addresses specific concerns of canine
training and accuracy, examines the problematic lack of federal or state
standards imposed on facilities, examines the most recent Supreme Court
case concerning canine sniffs, and concludes by proposing training standards modeled after Illinois practices.
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Police canines have been drafted for the ongoing ;Qar on drugs. since
the 1970s.1 They have been instrumental in sniffing out contraband and placing narcotics in the hands of law enforcement agencies across the country.
However, use of these drug-detecting canines during searches of automobiles
has unleashed douRts as to Qhether (rivate citiNens’ Eourth "mendment (roI
tections have been violated. These doubts arise from varying rates of accuracy in canine performance, as well as a lack of certification standards employed by the states and federal government. Because of such uncertainties,
this Note highlights the problematic areas of canine sniffs and shows that a
positive alert by a canine is insufficient to establish the probable cause required to search an automobile in the context of a lawful traffic stop. Without
any standardized training programs set by individual states or at the federal
level, there is no meaningful way to assess the reliability of a canine.
Part B Qill first Rriefly eO(lain the history of the U./. /u(reme Court’s
approach to the constitutionality of canine sniffs, and Part II will discuss the
controversy of the Illinois v. Caballes decision. Part III will discuss varying
rates of canine accuracy, provide a brief overview of canine training guidelines, and look to how federal and state court decisions examine canine reliability in the context of traffic stops. Finally, Part IV will highlight the most
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving canine sniffs and attempts to
reconcile that decision Qith the Court’s (rior decisions. Part B, Qill also adI
dress the complications posed by the inexistence of national/state standards
for certification and propose a solution modeled after Illinois practices. Finally, this Note will consider the growing legalization of marijuana in states
such as Colorado and consider potential problematic areas considering the
aforementioned uncertainties that surround narcotic-detecting canines.

1. Police Canines in History, DOGS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.dogsforlawenforcement.org/police-canines-in-history.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
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The keen sense of a canine’s smell ;is something dee(ly ingrained in
our general culture..2 " canine’s uni'ue aRility to detect odors comes from
their exceptional olfactory receptors<canines have about 25 times more receptors than humans do.3 Canines are also able to separate odors, which
makes them an ideal tool in drug-detecting searches.4 Despite the unique abilities that canines possess to detect odors, which humans do not possess, it is
impossible for a canine to know whether or not a particular odor comes from
contraband or legal substances.5
For example, a prescription drug that was legally obtained can give off
the odor of acetic acid, which is the same odor that is given off by heroin.6

There are thirty-two legal prescriptions that contain opioid compounds.7 Bmagine driving doQn the highQay Qhen you’re (ulled over for

travelling seven miles per hour over the speed limit by a state trooper. Tucked
away in the bottom of your console out of plain sight, you have a legal and
clearly labelled prescription bearing your name. The trooper initiates a traffic
stop and you decline her request to search your vehicle. Without any indication of you being in possession of narcotics, the trooper walks her canine unit
around your car, and the dog alerts to your legal prescription<giving the
state trooper the probable cause required to search an automobile without a
warrant. Because the canine is incapable of distinguishing a legal substance
from contraband, you are the subject of a completely invasive, warrantless
search of your automoRile. There’s no dis(ute as to the (oQer of the canine’s
sense of smellK Rut the 'uestion is Qhether the use of the canine’s sense of
smell, without articulated facts to give rise to individualized suspicion of a
person possessing contraband, should provide an officer probable cause to
justify a warrantless search.

2. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (explaining
Roth the nonfictional and fictional reliance on a canine’s sense of smellK including a declaration
by King Richard I, a passage from Silver Blaze, and a passage from The Odyssey).
3. Barry Cooper, Never Get Busted: Understanding Police Drug Dogs, CANNABIS
CULTURE (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.cannabisculture.com/content/2008/08/22/never-getbusted-understanding-police-drug-dogs (explaining why canines are preferred animals for detecting odors).
4. Id.
5. Lewis Katz & Aaron Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection
of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 755-54 M8GG3L M;Courts
are split as to whether an alert to methyl benzoate<which is the tell-tale odor of cocaine but
is found in many legal products--is actually an alert to cocaine.. (footnote omitted)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides citizens with the
right to Re ;secure in their (ersonsK housesK (a(ers, and effects, against unreasonaRle searches and seiNures..8 All evidence that is obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible, and this exclusionary rule also applies to the states.9 What the Fourth Amendment protects
are ;legitimate eO(ectations of (rivacy,.10 and courts analyze whether or not
the Fourth Amendment protections apply on a case-by-case basis.11 This
Note will primarily examine the use of narcotic-detection dogs in connection
with automobiles. This section explores how the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted canine sniffs and then discusses how some state constitutions provide
more protection than the United States Constitution surrounding canine
sniffs. This explanation will lay the groundwork in order to focus on the importance of the Illinois v. Caballes decision where the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that because a canine sniff only reveals the presence or absence
of contraband contained within a vehicle, the minimally invasive investigative technique does not constitute a search as to run afoul of the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.12
A.

C">B>F/ "RF >0T " ;/F"RCC. WBTCB> TCF MFANING OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Generally, a warrant is required in order for a lawful search to occur,13
however the search of an automobile falls under one of the exception categories.14 An automobile may be searched without a warrant if the search is
based on probable cause.15 ProRaRle cause has Reen defined as ;a fair (roRaI
bility that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
10. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
12. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. B, M;T"Snd no Qarrants shall issueK Rut u(on (roRaRle causeK
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to Re seiNed..L.
14. See CardQell v. ?eQisK 693 U./. 527K 51G M9136L MeO(laining that ;ToSne has a
lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its
contents are in (lain vieQ.L.
15. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996).
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(lace..16 The foundation behind the exception to procuring a warrant before
searching an automoRile is due to the ;inherent moRility. of the automoRile.17
However, ;TtShe Qord -automoRile’ is not a talisman in Qhose presence the
Eourth "mendment fades aQay and disa((ears..18 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a ;search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of
(rivacy..19
Law enforcement agencies have been utilizing narcotic-detecting canines in order to justify warrantless searches of homes,20 vehicles,21 and luggage22 to recover contraband.
Before the Caballes decision, which held a canine sniff of an automobile was not a search,23 United States v. Place24 was relied upon when analyzing canine sniffs under the Fourth Amendment. In Place, law enforcement
agents conducted a canine sniff of the defendant’s luggage at an air(ort and
the U.S. Supreme Court had to determine whether or not the canine sniff was
a search under the Fourth Amendment.25 The Court applied the Terry v. Ohio
approach to justify the warrantless search of the luggage.26 These principles
alloQed the agents to eO(ose the defendant’s luggageK Qhich Qas located in
a public place, to a narcotic-detecting canine because the sniff could not reveal the entire contents of the suitcase.27 The decision in Place is significant
because the U.S. Supreme Court held that a canine sniff was sui generis28
and not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.29 Thus, because the canine sniff is minimally intrusive, combined with the fact that the
16. United States v. Pinela-Hernandez, 262 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
17. Cady v. Dombowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).
19. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
20. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
21. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
22. See United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975).
23. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
24. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see also Hope Hall, Sniffing Out the
Fourth Amendment: United States v. Place4Dog Sniffs4Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REV.
151, 173 (1995) (discussing how prior to Caballes, courts relied on United States v. Place to
determine that canine sniffs were not searches under the Fourth Amendment).
25. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
26. Id. at 702 M;/(ecificallyK Qe are asked to a((ly the (rinci(les of Terry v. Ohio . .
. to permit such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective factsK that the luggage contains contraRand or evidence of a crime..L.
27. Id. at 707.
28. Sui Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (Sui Generis is defined
as ;of its oQn kind or class% uni'ue or (eculiar..L.
29. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. However, the Court did determine that the ninety-minute
detention of the defendant’s luggage was unreasonable, and therefore the initial seizure of the
luggage violated the Eourth "mendmentK and ultimately the suRse'uent ;search. of the lugI
gage was inadmissible. Id. at 709.
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luggage was located in a public place, the investigation did not constitute a
search as to violate the Fourth Amendment.30
B.

STATE APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT APPROACHES:
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
PROTECTIONS

Before Caballes was decided, courts relied on Place to analyze canine
sniffs.31 Jurisdictions were split on whether or not a canine sniff was a search
Qithin the meaning of each state’s constitution.32 For example, the highest
tribunal in New Hampshire held that a sniff is a search within the meaning
of the state constitutionK hoQever it can Re :ustified Qith a ;reasonaRle susI
(icion standard..33 In State v. Pellici, a concurring Justice of the Supreme
Court of >eQ Cam(shire said that ;TtShe reasonable expectation of privacy
concept enunciated in Katz has never been adopted by this court . . . ..34
There, the court held that a canine sniff of an automobile did indeed constitute a search under >eQ Cam(shire’s state constitution%35 the court went on
to say that ;our Constitution may Re more (rotective of individual rights than
the Eederal Constitution..36 Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court and circuit
courts have held in some instances that canine sniffs did not violate the
United States Constitution,37 a few individual states responded by providing
more protection to their citizens when analyzing whether or not a canine sniff
violated an individual’s rights under their state constitution.38

30. Id.
31. See generally United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir.
1990); United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 2002).
32. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 3:5, 3-37 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan, 1995).
33. Id.
34. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 725 (N.H. 1990).
35. Id. at 394 M;Fm(loying a trained canine to sniff a (erson’s private vehicle in order
to determine whether controlled substances are concealed inside is certainly a search in these
terms..L.
36. Id. at 715.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983); United States v.
Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding canine sniff on exterior of a
vehicle that is within police custody is not a search within the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that canine that is ;s(ecially trained
to detect the odor of controlled suRstances. is not a searchL.
38. See generally Marjorie Shields, Use of Trained Dogs to Detect Narcotics or
Drugs as Unreasonable in Violation of State Constitutions, 117 A.L.R. 5th 407 (2004) (discussing instances where canine sniffs have been held to violate a state constitution).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Wiegand analyzed the textually-identical (rovision of Minnesota’s constitution39 to the U.S. Constitution,40 and noted that they may ;construe TtheS (rovision of the Minnesota
Constitution to extend greater rights than a comparable provision in the U.S.
Constitution, but will not do so cavalierly..41 There, an officer stopped the
driver, Wiegand, for having a burned out headlight.42 Another officer arrived
on scene and was asked to write a warning ticket so the first officer could
conduct a canine sniff of Wiegand’s vehicle.43 The dog was walked around
the exterior of the vehicle and alerted multiple times to the same area, and a
subsequent search revealed marijuana under the hood of the car.44 The court
concluded that despite the fact that the canine sniff is limited in nature and
not a searchK the court’s analysis is one that must consider an individual’s
privacy interests.45 The court looked to the principles enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio and considered Qhether or not the canine sniff intruded on Wiegand’s
privacy interests.46 The court determined that a canine sniff around a vehicle
is ;intrusive to some degree. Qhen a vehicle is sto((ed for only a routine
traffic violation.47 "dditionallyK the court held that a canine sniff couldn’t Re
conducted on a vehicle without some sort of suspicion that illegal activity is
occurring; the court created a gray area (somewhere between probable cause
and ;mere Qhim.L Qhere an officer must find a :ustification for the canine
sniff for a stop solely centered around a routine equipment violation.48 In
sum, although the court in Wiegand determined that a canine sniff is not a
search Qithin the meaning of the state’s constitutionK it simultaneously eOI
tended (rotections to citiNens Ry re'uiring a reasonaRle level of an officer’s
suspicion that contraband is present.49 This case illustrates how a state government can appropriately guard its citizens from invasive searches and seizures. While Montana also has fallen into this line of interpretation,50 other
39. MINN. CONST. art. 1, §10 M;The right of the (eo(le to Re secure in their (ersonsK
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
(articularly descriRing the (lace to Re searched and the (erson or things to Re seiNed..L.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. See State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002).
42. Id. at 128.
43. Id. at 129.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 132-33.
46. WiegandK 465 >.W.8d at 977 M;Bn TTerry], the Court held that officers, on less
than probable cause, could conduct a limited search for weapons of persons suspected of criminal activity..L.
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See State v. Carlson, 15 P.3d 893, 897-98 (Mont. 2000).
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states have declined to find that their state constitutions provide a more expansive protection than the U.S. Constitution.51 As courts grappled with analyzing canine sniffs as searches within the meaning of state and federal constitution, there was an increasing divide among the courts that Illinois v. Caballes had to solve: whether or not a canine sniff of a vehicle required a level
of reasonable suspicion in order to begin the sniff of a vehicle.52

II.

CABALLES: UNLEASHING A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

This section will focus on how the Caballes decision expanded police
officers’ discretion in conducting traffic sto(sK and argues that the dissent’s
position is how courts should treat canine sniffs; it will then examine how
the Court first addressed evidentiary re'uirements for a canine’s (ositive
alert to be considered admissible in order to then consider the problematic
issue of canine accuracy. The Caballes decision extended Place to allow canine sniffs of an automobile; Caballes reRuffed the argument that a ;reasonI
aRle sus(icion. is re'uired Refore conducting a canine sniff.53 In Caballes,
the Court stated that ;TaS dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful
traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance
that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment..54
In Caballes, the defendant was stopped for speeding, and while receiving a warning ticket by the officer who pulled him over, a second trooper
arrived with a canine unit and walked the dog around the car.55 The dog
alerted to the trunk of the vehicle, where the officers searched the trunk and
recovered marijuana; the entire stop lasted less than ten minutes.56 At the trial
court level, Caballes was convicted and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment.57 On appeal, the heart of his argument was that because canine investigatory sniffs during a traffic stop were Fourth Amendment searches, they
should not Re conducted Qithout a ;reasonaRleK articulaRleK individualiNed
suspicion of wrongdoing that could be either sharpened or dispelled by the
sniff..58 In other words, Caballes argued that canine sniffs are intrusive to a
51. See State v. McMillan, 927 P.2d 949, 950 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Gama v. State,
920 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Nev. 1996).
52. Richard Meyers, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1,
24 (2006).
53. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
54. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
55. Id. at 406.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 407.
58. Brief for Respondent at 6, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923),
2004 WL 2097415, at *6.
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degree, and because there was no indication by Caballes that he had contraband in his vehicle, the canine sniff should not have been conducted because
the sniff would not reveal anything relevant to the traffic violation.59 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that the use of the
canine during the lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because
there was no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband.60
But the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment, holding Caballes had no
legitimate privacy interest in the contraband contained in his trunk.61 The
U.S. Supreme Court determined that because the traffic stop was not unreasonably delayed, and the dog sniff occurred on the exterior of his vehicle, the
use of the canine only exposed the contraband that Caballes had no right to
possess, and therefore there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.62
Austice /outer’s strong dissenting opinion in Caballes provides a better
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment protections, and emphasizes reasonable suspicion should be required to justify the use of a drug detection dog.63
FOtremely ske(tical of the ma:ority’s decisionK he Qrote ;TtShe infallible dog,
hoQeverK is a creature of legal fiction..64 He goes on to state that:
[The canine sniffs] are conducted to obtain information about the contents of private spaces beyond
anything that human senses could perceive, even
when conventionally enhanced. The information is
not provided by independent third parties beyond
the reach of constitutional limitations, but gathered
Ry the government’s own officers in order to justify
searches of the traditional sort, which may or may
not reveal evidence of crime but will disclose anything meant to be kept private in the area searched.65
Justice Souter emphasized that the canine sniff should have been treated
as a search, and then analyzed to determine if the search was reasonable in
accordance with case precedent.66 However, the majority opinion relied upon
United States v. Place that categorized the canine sniff as sui generis and not

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id.
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. 2005).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005).
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
See id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 414.
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a ;search. as inter(reted under Eourth "mendment considerations.67 Disagreeing, Justice Souter explained that because we must recogniNe the ;dog’s
falliRilityK. a sniff cannot Re recogniNed as sui generis because of the innate
unreliability of the canine, which would not necessarily alert to hidden contraband or other evidence of crime.68 Justice Ginsburg also joined in dissent,
noting that Caballes was stopped solely for driving six miles over the speed
limit, and by bringing the canine to the routine stop it changed the character
of the encounter.69 In other words, the dissent points out that the traffic stop
in Caballes became broader and more confrontational once the canine arrivedK and that CaRalles Recame eO(osed to ;the embarrassment and intimidation of being investigated, on a public thoroughfare, for drugs..70
The decision in Caballes created a dangerous precedent for Fourth
Amendment protections. In Caballes, the first officer writing the warning
ticket to Caballes did not even request for the second trooper to arrive with
his canine unit; the second officer arrived only after overhearing the traffic
stop over the radio transmission.71 The use of an unrequested canine unit to
conduct a drug investigation subsequent to an offense of travelling six miles
over the speed limit undeniably expanded the stop. In support for the defense,
the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Illinois as Amici Curiae provided:
A drug-detection dog adds no value to the investigation of a simple traffic infraction. A trained dog
cannot ascertain the speed at which a vehicle was
traveling or the true state of an apparently broken
tail-light . . . . Nor are the services of a drug-detection dog useful with respect to any of the other purposes for which a routine traffic stop may be made.
What drug-detection dogs are used for is investigating the presence of drugs<a legitimate matter for
investigation, to be sure, but not one with any reasonable connection to the class of infractions that
result in a routine traffic stop. Thus, the use of such
dogs necessarily extends the scope of a routine traffic stop . . . [t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits the
police from crossing that line, absent independent
67. Caballes, 542 U.S. at 409.
68. Id. at 412-13.
69. Id. at 421-88 M;Fven if the drug sniff is not characterized as a Fourth Amendment
-search’ . . . the sniff surely broadened the scope of the traffic-violation-related seiNure.. (citations omitted)).
70. Id. at 421.
71. Id. at 406.
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probable cause, or at least individualized suspicion
. . . . If individuals were subject to such arbitrary
governmental treatment every time they violated a
traffic ordinance, the security guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment would disappear.72
"rmed Qith the ma:ority’s decisionK laQ enforcement agencies Qere given
permission to treat anyone stopped for even a minor traffic violation as

a criminal suspect in a drug investigation.
A.

FLORIDA V. HARRIS: DETERMINING A CANI>F’/
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS

In the wake of Caballes, one question remained unanswered: just how
reliable does a canine have to be in order to consider the alert to be admissible? The Caballes decision clarified that a canine sniff was not an unlawful
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,73 however it was Florida v. Harris that examined the exact issue of whether or not a canine alert
(rovides (roRaRle cause to search an automoRile in light of the canine’s reliI
ability.74 ThereK the U./. /u(reme Court held that ;[i]f a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a
court can presume . . . that the dog’s alert (rovides (roRaRle cause to
search..75 Defendant Harris was pulled over for an expired license plate; the
officer Qas on (atrol Qith a canine unit and Relieved Carris to Re ;visiRly
nervousK. and also noted that Carris had an o(en Reer can in the console of
the truck.76 Aldo, the canine on patrol, was trained to detect specific narcotics
such as ;metham(hetamineK mari:uanaK cocaineK heroinK and ecstasy..77 The
officer Qalked "ldo around the vehicleK and the dog alerted at the driver’s
side door handle.78 Based on the alert, the officer searched Harris’s vehicle
and discovered ingredients used to make methamphetamine (pseudoephedrine pills, hydrochloric acid, antifreeze, etc.).79 However, Aldo was not

72. Brief for the Am. Civil Liberties Union & the ACLU of Illinois as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S 405 (No. 03-923), 2004 WL
2097416, at *9.
73. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
74. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1053 (2013).
75. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
76. Id. at 1053.
77. Id. at 1053.
78. Id. at 1053-54.
79. Id.
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trained to detect any of these substances.80 After Harris was charged for possession and manufacturing of methamphetamine, he posted bail and again
was pulled over by the same officer and canine unit.81 Again, Aldo was instructed to sniff the exterior of the vehicle where he alerted to the truck, but
no contraband was discovered in the search.82 Harris claimed that there was
no probable cause to search the vehicle, and filed a motion to suppress.83
Des(ite the inaccuracy of "ldo’s (erformance in the fieldK the trial court conI
cluded that there Qas (roRaRle cause to search Carris’s vehicle.84 The Florida
Supreme Court reversedK hoQeverK finding that looking at the ;totality of the
circumstancesK. there Qas no (roRaRle cause to search a vehicle Recause ;the
fact that the dog has been trained and certified is simply not enough to establish probable cause..85
The Florida Supreme Court noted the problematic lack of uniform certification standards imposed by the state by voicing concerns over the fact
that each program that certifies canines operates differently.86 There, they
determined that an alert by the canine alone does not establish probable
cause; instead, the:
State must present the training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular
training and certification of that dog, field performance records, and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog,
as well as any other objective evidence . . . .87
The rationale Rehind the court’s decision Qas not to im(ede (olice investigaI
tions Ry creating a (recedent for a ;virtually infalliRle.88 canine; the court
reasoned that the totality of the circumstances approach means that to prove
that (roRaRle cause eOistedK the /tate must (resent all of the canine’s certifiI
cation documentation.89
80. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1054.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1055.
85. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055 (quoting Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla.
2011)).
86. Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 759 (Fla. 2011).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 772.
89. Id. M;Aust as it Qould Re entirely relevant to knoQ hoQ many times an informant’s
tip resulted in contraband being discovered, the reason that the State should keep records of
the dog’s performance both in training and in the field is so that the trial court may adequately
evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s Relief in the dog’s reliability under the totality of
the circumstances..L.
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The Supreme Court established the totality of the circumstance approach in Illinois v. Gates, where it determined that probable cause was a
;fluid conce(t.K and Ry its nature involved a standard that is a ;(racticalK
nontechnical conce(tion..90 In Harris, the Supreme Court determined that
the Florida Supreme Court misconstrued the meaning of the ;totality of the
circumstances. a((roach Ry creating an ;evidentiary checklist.K Qhich is the
opposite of the fluidity of the probable cause standard.91 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that instead of mandating the State to turn over all evidence detailing a canine’s trainingK evidence of the canine’s ;satisfactory (erforI
mance. (rovides reason to trust in the alert.92 This approach, according to the
Supreme Court, is more appropriate because the field reports may contain
errors.93 " dog’s reliaRility is best measured in a controlled testing environment because the designers of the program know where contraband is hidden
and where it is not, whereas in the field, a dog may alert to a car and the
officer finds no narcotics because either they are too well hidden, the scent
came from a residual odorK or they could Re on the driver’s (erson.94 Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the finding of probable cause cannot
depend on a multitude of independent requirements.95 Instead, as long as a
;Rona fide organiNation. has certified a dog after its training in a controlled
setting, a court can presume the alert is reliable.96 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that if the state provides proof that the dog was certified in a controlled
setting, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the court
should determine probable cause existed.97 On the other hand, if the defendant disputes the reliability of the alert, then the court should weigh the competing evidence.98 According to the Supreme Court, a court should not demand ;an infleOiRle set of evidentiary re'uirements. that the Elorida /uI
preme Court attempted to prescribe.99
The Florida Supreme Court attempted to assess the quality of the canine
Ry eOamining the entirety of a canine’s (erformance recordK while the U.S.
/u(reme Court su((orted a ;common sense. standard.100 With this decision,
the ;totality of the circumstances. a((roachK it seemsK shifted from the loQer
court’s careful consideration of all relevant and availaRle evidence concernI
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983).
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013).
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1056-57.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing a dog’s reliaRility to a vagueK overRroad ;Qho’s-a-good-Roy. scratch ReI
hind the ear u(on the mere com(letion of a training (rogram. The ;common
sense. standard glossed over ;the potential for false alerts, the potential for
handler error, and the possibility of alerts to residual odors..101 From a practical standpoint, defendants will continue to face challenges of canine accuracy as long as there is the approval of subpar certification facilities because
there’s little accountaRility and eO(lanation of the significance of a canine’s
accuracy rates.102

III.

CANINE ACCURACY

This section will give an overview of how some circuits have analyzed
the canine accuracy rates that were presented and challenged by defendants,
and will then look to specific organization standards that certify canines and
highlight how such standards lack uniformity. This Note emphasizes that a
canine with a substandard accuracy record should not conduct a canine sniff
of a vehicle because an officer should not be permitted to conduct a fullblown search of a vehicle after relying on an untrustworthy alert. The reliability of the narcotic-detecting canine must be scrutinized because probable
cause exists once a canine alerts his handler<however, the canine is unable
to be cross-examined to explain its behavior. There can be two types of errors
that occur during a canine sniff; a dog can fail to alert when drugs are present
M;false negative.LK and a dog can alert Qhen drugs are not (resent M;false
(ositive.L.103 In Caballes, Justice Souter alerted the majority to the threats of
canine fallibility; he cited varying percentages of canine accuracy rates found
in federal and state court decisions.104 For example, he pointed out in United
States v. Kennedy, the handler of the canine M;!oRo.L failed to keep records
of his canine’s field Qork as instructed Ry the training facility. 105 The court
there emphasized the importance of continuous training and field monitoring,
and further noted that a dog may lose its effectiveness and revert from its
trained behavior.106 !oRo’s success rate Qas determined to Re an alarmingly
low 71.4%.107 Despite the careless recordkeeping of the canine, the court
nevertheless determined that this accuracy rate meets the probable cause

101. See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 768 (Fla. 2011).
102. See Taylor Phipps, Probable Cause on a Leash, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 57, 70-81
(2014).
103. Robert Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 K.Y. L.J. 405, 427 (1997).
104. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005).
105. United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1997).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1375.
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threshold.108 Other cases noted by Justice Souter included an examination of
a canine’s 31) success Qhile on a s(ecific assignment Qith a (ostal serI
vice,109 and another instance where the handler was aware his canine had
been inaccurate between ten and fifty times.110
Additionally, in a recent Seventh Circuit decision, Justice Wood delivered the opinion of the court examining the alert rates of Lex, a canine who
was prone to signaling for false positives.111 In U.S. v. BentleyK ?eO’s overall
accuracy rate was determined by the number of times he alerted and the number of times his handler found drugs; the result is a disappointing 59.5%.112
Lex also alerted 93% of the time he is commanded to initiate an open-air sniff
of a vehicle.113 The head of the facility where Lex completed his training
testified that indicating at that high of a rate in the field is not favorable.114
The dog’s 17) rate is high Recause it is emRedded in the innate Rias of the
canine; Lex is called when police officers already suspect drugs may be present.115 ?eO’s handler testified that ?eO Qill receive a special reward, a rubber
hose stuffed with a sock, each time that Lex alerts.116 The typical behavior of
a dog to Re motivated Ry a reQard is a concernK and ?eO’s reQard is a (olicy
Qhich the court Relieved to Re ;a terriRle Qay to (romote accurate detection
. . . ..117
The court in Bentley noted other district decisions Qhere the canine’s
accuracy rates range from 43%-62%, and these rates are enough to prevail
because probable cause has been determined to be something less than a preponderance.118 Despite the acceptance of the underwhelming success rate of
the handful of canines discussed in Bentley, the court cautioned that these
loQ accuracy rates should not Re ;a race to the Rottom.K and the :ustice sysI
tem should improve the quality and reliability of the canines; otherwise, a
failure to do so will result in the suppression of evidence obtained from the
search.119 The problem with canine sniffs lies in the resulting search; even
though the accuracy of a canine’s alert could Re determined Ry a toss of a
108. Id. at 1378.
109. United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997).
110. Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001); see also United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 2014) (examining the reliability of a canine named
Henri; Cenri’s accuracy rate Qas 53) and the court there folloQed case (recedent that held a
prior accuracy rate of 54% was sufficient to support the denial of a motion to suppress).
111. United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2015).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 636.
115. Id.
116. Bentley, 795 F.3d at 636.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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coinK the harm to an individual’s Eourth "mendment (rotections have alI
ready been sustained when their belongings become subject to an invasive
search as a product of an unreliable canine alert.
Even further, a dissenting justice in a Colorado Supreme Court decision
Qrote that the ma:ority re:ected the ;(ossiRility -that the alert of a trained
narcotics detection dog can indicate anything more than the presence or absence of contraRand.’.120 In People v. Esparza, the justice cited a study completed by the Chicago Tribune in 2011.121 The Chicago Tribune’s study revealed a troubling analysis of Illinois traffic stops in the years 2007-2009.122
Of the canine sniffs that were conducted, only 44% of alerts by canines led
to the discovery of drugs or paraphernalia; for Hispanic drivers, drugs were
only found 27% of the times that the canine alerted, suggesting that the canines are being used in conjunction with racial profiling in order to recover
contraband.123 The study revealed that these low accuracy rates could have
been a result of either 1) walking the canine around the vehicle too many
times, or 2) the problem that residual odor poses; both of these instances can
result in a dog alerting to drugs without the actual presence of drugs.124 In the
Colorado decision, Justice Hobbs also criticized the majority which held that
there were no privacy interests in the possession of contraband, but this ignores the possibilities of false positives that canines provide,125 as indicated
by the Chicago Tribune. CoRRs eO(lainedK ;it is not merely the -privacy interest in the (ossession of contraRandK’ Rut the full privacy interest against
search without adequate justification<against -unreasonable searches’. is
the (ro(er analysis under the language of the state’s constitution and Colorado precedent.126 In other words, the justification of the search does not rest
solely on an individual’s lack of (rivacy interest in illegal suRstancesK Rut Qe
should instead consider the individual’s (rivacy interests in the conteOt of
searches that lack reasonable suspicion.127
Dogs do not have the ability to motivate themselves to improve or acquire skills, but rather they are conditioned to respond to specific stimuli. 128
120. People v. Esparza, 272 P.3d 367, 372 (Colo. 2012) (holding that because narcotic
detection dogs can only communicate the presence or absence of contraband, there was no
intrusion of defendant’s reasonaRle (rivacy interests during a canine’s sniff of a truck (arked
in a motel parking lot).
121. Id.
122. Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong: Police Canines Can Fall
Short, but Observers Cite Residue and Poor Training as Factors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2011, at
1,10.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Esparza, 272 P.3d at 372.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See id.
128. Matheson v. State, 870 So.2d 8, 13 (Fla. 2003).
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As noted supra, canines are not capable of distinguishing contraband from
otherwise legal substances.129 This also presents a problem for any residual
odors that may be present within the vehicle. Recall that in Harris, the canine
"ldo alerted to the driver’s side handle Rut no contraRand Qas found% the
explanation was that the odor of methamphetamine that Aldo was trained to
detect transferred to the door handle.130 Dismissing the defendant’s assertion
that a dog’s field (erformance must Re consideredK Austice @agan in Harris
discussed that field records are not necessarily accurate due to record-keeping by the handlers; the dog could have smelled residual odors that were present at one time, but are not present any longer.131 Training programs may
either encourage false alerts to residual odors or fail to train canines to ignore
them; it is possible to train the canines to discern present drugs from residual
odors, however, typical canine-training programs do not train canines to distinguish between the two.132 The problem with the lack of exclusionary training arises Qhen the citiNens’ constitutional protections become threatened if
a canine alerts to a residual odor that may have been present at some time in
the past, but there is no current illegal activity occurring. Most concerning,
this inability to differentiate between the presence of contraband and residual
odors has not barred a determination of probable cause among the circuits.133
This is Qhere the U./. /u(reme Court’s decision in Harris becomes problematic% as long as a canine is certified from a ;Rona fide. organiNationK then
the alert is considered reliable and a probable cause finding is warranted,134
hoQeverK an individual’s (rivacy interests are tram(led Qhen the canine is
incapable of determining whether or not illegal substances are present at the

129. See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 5, at 755.
130. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (2013).
131. Id. at 1056-57; see also United States v. Warren, 997 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (E.D.
Wis. 9112L Mdiscussing a handler’s record kee(ing of his canine; if the canine alerts to a container and no contraband is found, the handler does not record it as a false positive, but instead
Relieves the dog must have smelled ;residual odor. that must have Reen (resent in the (astK
accrediting the canine with a 100% accuracy rate).
132. Brief for The >at’l "ss’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (No. 11-817), 2012 WL
3875241, at *20. However, canines employed by U.S. Customs are trained not to alert to residual odors. Id.
133. See United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the
a((ellant’s argument Qith res(ect to the canine’s inaRility to distinguish residual odors from
the actual presence of drugs misconstrues the (roRaRle cause re'uirement Recause ;aRsolute
certainty. is not re'uiredK only a reasonaRle Relief that a crime is Reing committed is necesI
sary); United States v. Chartier, 772 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the results of a
search incident to arrest do not justify the search, but here probable cause existed before the
search because the canine alerted to the vehicle; even though no drugs were found in the vehicle, other materials of interest were).
134. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
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moment of the search. Our privacy rights vary because the criminal justice
system assesses facts differently using varying legal standards.135
A.

CANINE TRAINING

There are no prescribed regulation standards for canine certification and
training for narcotics detection, but each canine training facility offers programs Rased on each facility’s oQn standards.136 These standards vary greatly
across the board.137 As the Florida Supreme Court in Harris pointed out,
without some sort of standardized certification and training program (either
nation-wide or (rescriRed Ry the statesLK a canine’s reliaRility cannot Re esI
tablished by the mere completion of a training program alone because there
is no way to uniformly assess the training and certification that the canine
receives.138 As it stands today, standards are set by few individual states, private organizations, federal agencies, and the military.139

1.

Federal Agencies & Military

The United States Customs Border Patrol employs a rigorous twelveweek course where only half of the canines successfully complete the training,140 and the agency demands a near-perfect record of 96%.141 The Customs
Border Patrol Canine Program teaches canines to detect marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine, hashish, and ecstasy.142 To maintain the canine’s
training, four-hours per week are spent practicing with each dog, and an annual recertification test is required.143 The United States Army requires a
minimum training course for canines that includes four-hours of training per

135. Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 792-93 (2013) (discussing the unquantifiable value of probable
cause<some :udges and scholars Qould assign the ;fair (roRaRility. (ercentage to fall anywhere between 30 and 60 percent).
136. Leslie Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniff of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 835-36
(2009).
137. Brief for Fourth Amendment Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 22, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (No. 11-817), 2012 WL 3864280, at * 22
(citing Matheson v. State, 870 So. 2d 8, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
138. See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 759 (Fla. 2011).
139. Meyers, supra note 52, at 27.
140. Bird, supra note 103, at 414.
141. Bird, supra note 103, at n.81.
142. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Canine Disciplines, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC.,https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program/disciplines-2
(last updated May 23, 2016).
143. Bird, supra note 103, at 421.
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week after completion of the initial training.144 Narcotic-detecting canines
must maintain a proficiency rate of 90% or higher.145 Most notably, there is
even a designated ;ProRaRle Cause. folder that contains an array of forms
and records to prove the reliability of the MWD (military working dog).146

2.

State Standards

Only a handful of state legislatures have explicitly prescribed certain
standards that canines must meet in order to be deemed certified. For exam(leK >eQ Vork /tate’s Division of Criminal Austice /ervices has minimal
standards set in place concerning narcotic detecting canines.147 If a canine
and handler have not been previously trained, then they are required to complete a 160-hour training program.148 However, the minimal standard for performance of the canine and handler is recorded as either ;(ass or failK. Qith
no guidelines to assess what a passing score is.149
Illinois is one of the few states in the U.S. to enact a statute that requires
canines to meet any sort of certification standards. Under Bllinois’s Police
Training "ctK ;all (olice dogs used by State and local law enforcement agencies for drug enforcement purposes . . . shall be trained by programs that meet
the minimum certification re'uirements set Ry the !oard..150 The Illinois
Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board determined that there were
thirty-eight training entities that meet the ;minimum certification re'uireI
ments..151 One of the training facilities employs a 90% passage rate requirement in order for a canine to be deemed to have met the certification requirements.152 Details of these requirements will be discussed in detail below, as
this Note argues that states should model their certification requirements for
narcotic canine training after Illinois.
144. Military Working Dogs, HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY 2-4 (July 6, 2005),
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-19-17.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2-9.
147. See Police Canine Training Standard, BUREAU FOR N.Y. MUN. POLICE (June 5,
1991), http://www.policek9.com/html/new_york.html.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10.12 (2016).
151. Narcotic Detection Canines Compliance Program: Minimum Certification Requirements, ILL. LAW ENF’T TRAINING & STANDARD BD., http://www.ptb.state.il.us/media/1243/narcoticdetectioncaninerequirements.pdf (last updated Mar. 2017) [hereinafter Narcotic Detection Canines Compliance Program].
152. Narcotic Detection Canine Minimum Certification Requirements, ILL. LAW ENF’T
TRAINING & STANDARD BD., http://directives.chicagopolice.org/lt2015/forms/NARC2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Narcotic Detection Canine Minimum Certification Requirements].
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Private Organizations

Private organizations such as the United States Police K9 Association
Mhereinafter ;U/PC".L em(loy their oQn certification standards. "ccording
to USPCA, as long as a canine receives a 70% passing score the canine is
deemed to be certified.153 Canines are instructed to complete a vehicle search
area and an indoor search area, and are tested to locate marijuana, hashish,
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.154 Another organization, the North
"merican Police Work Dog "ssociation Mhereinafter ;>"PWD".LK also creI
ates their own certification standards.155 NAPWDA requires that the canine
passes the test with a minimum of 91.66%.156 This organization requires the
canines to search vehiclesK RuildingsK luggageK and lockersK and ;conflict
odors. are (resent Qhile the canine is Reing tested.157
As you can see, there are multiple private organizations across the nation that have varying passing rates, ranging from 75 percent158 to 90 percent.159 Further, because some organizations train canines to detect certain
narcotics, while other organizations may train canines to detect other substancesK ;certified. canines in the field are aRle to detect a variety of narcotics
that another canine is not trained to detect.160 The problem this presents, coupled with the varying success rate percentages that canines must meet in order to Recome certifiedK means that there’s no uniform standard to assess any
given canine’s reliaRility in the field. !ecause a ma:ority of the states have

153. General Rules and Definitions Governing Certifications: Detection Canines,
http://www.uspcak9.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NARCOTIC-CERTIFICATIONRULES-2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
154. Id.
155. See Bylaws and Certification Rules, N. AM. POLICE WORK DOG ASS’N (June 18,
2016), http://www.napwda.com/uploads/bylaws-cert-rules-june-18-2016.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Standards for Training & Certifications Manual, NAT’L POLICE CANINE ASS’N 10
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://npcaforms.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/standards.pdf.
159. Certification Standards, NAT’L TACTICAL POLICE DOG ASS’N (2008),
http://www.tacticalcanine.com/certification-standards/.
160. See generally Narcotic Detection Standards, NAT’L NARCOTIC DETECTOR DOG
ASS’N, http://www.nndda.org/docs/NarcoticsStandard14.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (canines must find only marijuana and cocaine in order to be certified); Narcotics Detection,
USK9 UNLIMITED, http://www.usk9.com/narcotics.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (canines
are trained to detect Marijuana, Hashish, Powder Cocaine, Crack, Methamphetamine, Ecstasy,
Heroin, LSD).
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not enacted legislation explicitly defining minimum certification requirements, these private organizations are responsible for determining which
sniffs are ;u( to snuff.161 when it comes to certifying canines.
When there’s no oR:ective standard in (lace to assess a canine’s reliaI
RilityK there’s no Qay to meaningfully criti'ue a canine’s (erformance.162 The
Harris court provided that a dog that completes a certified program from a
bona fide organization is reliable;163 this has the effect that the canine that
can only detect marijuana or cocaine with a 70% success rate is just as reliable as the canine that is able to detect six illegal substances that completed
the rigorous course with a requisite of a 98% success rate. In theory, both
canines have differing levels of accuracy and can detect different substances,
so the question becomes how to measure their reliability with no uniform
standard. A defendant must be afforded the opportunity to challenge a canine’s reliaRilityK164 but with such varying certification standards existing
across the board, challenging such reliability records becomes difficult. Recall that the nontechnical probable cause standard already affords law enforcement officers wide flexibility in determining which facts are present to
establish probable cause; however, when you add the uncertainties surrounding canine performance and reliability to the unquantifiable probable cause
standard, a defendant is faced with challenging a gray area of the law. Thus,
the lack of an individualized, articulable suspicion requirement dismissed by
the Caballes decision,165 coupled with the lack of standardized certification
standards Roth nationQide and stateQideK illustrate hoQ citiNens’ Eourth
Amendment protections have been diluted by the Supreme Court.

IV.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW: RODRIGUEZ AND MOVING FORWARD

2013 was the year of the dog; the U.S. Supreme Court rendered two
decisions concerning the constitutionality of canine sniffs.166 Harris, discussed earlierK determined that a canine’s alert is reliaRle and serves as (roRI
aRle cause as long as the canine Qas trained and certified from a ;Rona fide
organization..167 In the other decision, Florida v. Jardines, the U.S. Supreme
Court diverted from its previous decision concerning drug-detection dogs,
161. See generally Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013) (explaining that the
'uestion is ;Qhether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alertK vieQed through the lens of comI
mon sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff Qhen it meets that test.L.
162. See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 759 (Fla. 2011).
163. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
164. Id. at 1052.
165. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
166. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1417 (2013).
167. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056-57.
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and held that the use of a canine sniff is considered a search when the sniff
is conducted on the front porch of a person’s home Recause the officer’s
(hysical intrusion on the (ersons’ (ro(erty to gather evidence Qith the use of
a trained dog to detect evidence of wrongdoing violates the Fourth Amendment.168 /oK Qhile the U./. /u(reme Court may have determined individual’s
privacy rights are subject to a lesser standard in terms of automobiles, they
determined that a (erson’s (rivacy rights in the conteOt of a search of their
home warrants a stricter standard. As you can see, the Supreme Court remains vigilant in the protection of an individual’s homeK Rut Qith the Caballes and Harris decisions, it seemed as if the Court was willing to give law
enforcement officers a little slack on the proverbial leash when it comes to
searching for drugs on "merica’s (uRlic roadQays.
A.

RODRIGUEZ: TIGHTENING THE LEA/C 0> ;W"?@B>D
/F"RCC W"RR">T/.169

The dissent in Caballes cautioned against prolonging a traffic stop for
any amount of time without reasonable suspicion,170 but in 2015, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States171 showed its concern with the
flexibility that officers had in conducting their canine sniffs. There, a brightline rule was announced concerning canine sniffs and traffic stops; where no
reasonable suspicion exists beyond that which was necessary to justify the
stop itself, a traffic stop may not be prolonged in order to conduct a canine
investigation.172 Before Rodriguez, law enforcement officers were operating
under a broader scope of searching individuals during routine traffic stops
because Caballes determined that canine sniffs are not searches, and do not
violate the Fourth Amendment.173 In Rodriguez, an officer pulled over the
driver, Dennys Rodriguez, for driving on the shoulder of the road.174 While
conducting the traffic stop, the officer asked for another unit to arrive with a
canine.175 After the officer completed the traffic stop by issuing and explaining the warning, the officer asked Rodriguez if he could walk the canine
around the car, and Rodriguez declined.176 Moments later, the canine unit
arrived, alerted to the presence of narcotics, and after the alert by the canine
168. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
169. John Ensminger, Walking Search Warrants: Canine Forensics and Police Culture After Florida v. Harris, 10 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1 (2014) (discussing where an
Ohio sheriff described his narcotic-detecting canine as a ;Qalking search Qarrant.L.
170. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420-21.
171. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
172. Id. at 1616.
173. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420-21.
174. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
175. Id. at 1613.
176. Id.
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the officers found methamphetamine.177 Approximately seven or eight
minutes passed from the time the warning was issued until the time the canine
alerted.178
The Eighth Circuit held that the several minutes that had passed did not
equate to an unreasonable delay, and the sniff was a minor intrusion on RodrigueN’s constitutional (rotections.179 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, resolving a circuit split concerning whether or not police, absent
reasonable suspicion, can extend a completed traffic stop in order to conduct
a canine sniff.180 The U.S. Supreme Court tightened the leash on law enforcement agencies conducting narcotics investigations by holding that investigations unrelated to the initial lawful traffic stop are permitted, however, the
investigation cannot be done in such a way as to prolong the stop, even for a
minimal delay.181 As these cases keep nipping at the heels of the Supreme
Court, it remains to be seen how it will continue to Ralance an individual’s
(rivacy rights against the government’s interest in the Qar on drugs.
Significantly, Rodriguez shows us that the Supreme Court seems to be
reconsidering its precedent in the context of canine sniffs.182 This decision is
extremely important when analyzing canine sniffs because the Supreme
Court is carving out the actual purpose of the traffic stop while also defining
how much time officers have while making the traffic stop when utilizing
drug-detecting canines.183 When Justice Ginsberg, who dissented in the Caballes opinion, wrote that a stop that is unreasonably prolonged is unlawful,184 the Court unambiguously made Rodriguez a key player in protecting
citiNens’ rights under the Eourth "mendment. When considering these (roI
tections from a policy perspective, the courts must always balance an individual’s (rivacy right against the government’s interest in keeping drugs off
the streets. This decision is important because many officers initiate traffic
stops for one reason, and transform it into an investigation for narcotics or
other crimes.185

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613-14.
180. Id. at 1614.
181. Id. at 1616-17.
182. Rory Little, -pinion Analysis; Traffic Stops Can’t 5ast Too 5ong or 8o Too Far,
and No Extra Dog Sniffs!, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/opinion-analysis-traffic-stops-cant-last-too-long-or-go-too-far-and-noextra-dog-sniffs/.
183. Jeffrey Rosen, Orin Kerr & Christopher Slobogin, Podcast: The Fourth Amendment and Police Dog Searches, CONST. DAILY (Apr. 23, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/04/podcast-the-fourth-amendment-and-police-dog-searches/.
184. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
185. Rosen et al., supra note 183.
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Rodriguez is a necessary limitation on this police practice because traffic laws are broken routinely by drivers who are otherwise law-abiding citizens.186 Fven though a dog’s keen sense of smell has Reen instrumental in
removing drugs from individuals and putting them in the hands of law enforcement, use of these dogs also intimidates drivers.187 Employing the drugdetecting canines without reasonable suspicion is a form of harassment, especially when a disproportionate amount of drivers are people of color.188
Ultimately, Rodriguez im(oses limits on laQ enforcement officers’ aRility to
change the nature of otherwise routine traffic stops by stating that these routine traffic stops cannot be prolonged just to conduct a canine sniff absent
individualized and reasonable suspicion. If this sounds familiar, recall the
Caballes decision where both the defendant and the dissent argued that an
individualized, articulable suspicion should be present before an officer can
even employ the use of a canine sniff on an automobile.189 Because of the
uncertainties surrounding canine reliability, this Note stresses that a reasonable, individualized suspicion should be articulated and present in order for
an officer to conduct a canine sniff around an automobile.
B.

ESTABLISHING STANDARDS MODELED AFTER ILLINOIS

The U./. /u(reme Court’s neOt ste( in resolving (roRlematic issues
with canine detection should be establishing a nationwide standard that organizations must meet in order to determine that a canine performing a sniff
is certified. While the Supreme Court in Harris told us that a dog’s alert (roI
vides (roRaRle cause (ursuant to receiving training from a ;Rona fide organI
iNation.K it offers no guidance as to Qhat criteria facilities should model their
programs after.190 However, in Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped
the opportunity to prescribe certain evidentiary standards when they overturned the Elorida /u(reme Court’s decision.191 Thus, uniform certification
requirements nationwide are unlikely to be imposed by the Supreme Court,
but the individual states could seek to establish uniformity within their own
state lines Ry folloQing Bllinois’s res(onse to (roRlematic canine searches.
Illinois has not statutorily prescribed precise standards for narcotic detecting canines. However, under the Illinois Police Training Act (hereinafter
;the "ct.LK ;police dogs used by State and local law enforcement agencies
186. See Rosen et al., supra note 183. M;Fvery one of us violates multi(le traffic laQs
every time we drive . . . police know this, and use it to their advantage especially if it means
they’re trying to discover drug crime..L.
187. See Rosen et al., supra note 183.
188. See Rosen et al., supra note 183.
189. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S 405, 410-12 (2005).
190. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
191. Id. at 1056.
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for drug enforcement purposes . . . shall be trained by programs that meet the
minimum certification requirements set by the Board..192 ;The !oard. refers
to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (hereinafter
;B?FT/!.L.193 Not only has the statute explicitly provided that the ILETSB
has the authority to determine the specific requirements that canines must
meet in order to be certified but the statute goes on to prescribe specific requirements that the canine handler must meet.194 The Illinois legislature has
determined that in order to be qualified, a canine handler must complete: 1)
one-hundred hours of basic training, 2) eighty-hours devoted to the specific
canine discipline, and 3) a practical qualification course and written exam. 195
Thus, the Illinois legislature is able to determine what makes a canine handler
qualified, as well as encourage the ILETSB to establish uniformity within
state boundaries when it comes to canine training.
Even though Illinois law does not explicitly prescribe in the statute a
canine’s minimum hours like it does for the handler, the programs have some
leniency in their own certification requirements. As stated, ILETSB establishes the minimum certification requirements.196 ILETSB has explicitly determined thirty-eight facilities that meet the requirements;197 thus, as long as
a canine has completed training from one of these facilities, the canine has
met the requirements within the meaning of the statute. These facilities must
employ training programs modeled after the Scientific Working Group on
Dog and Orthogonal detector Guidelines Mhereinafter ;/WDD0D.L.198
SWGDOG is a partnership of multiple federal and state agencies that was
created to address the need to improve canine performance and reliability.199
Illinois encourages training facilities to certify and recertify accurate
and reliable canines for narcotics detection with uniformity in mind; there are
only a few other states besides Illinois that have enacted legislation that concerns police canine training.200 In Illinois, Macon County’s training facility
192. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10.12 (2016).
193. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/2 (2016).
194. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 447/35-42 (2016).
195. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 447/35-42 (basic training involves safety procedures, basic
veterinary health, canine conditioning, obedience, search techniques, and ;legal guidelines
affecting canine odor detection o(erations.L.
196. See 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10.12 (2016). To vieQ the ;minimum certification
re'uirementsK. see Narcotic Detection Canine Minimum Certification Requirements, supra
note 152.
197. Narcotic Detection Canines Compliance Program, supra note 151.
198. Narcotic Detection Canines Compliance Program, supra note 151. See generally
SWGDOG: SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON DOG AND ORTHOGONAL DETECTOR GUIDELINES,
FLA. INT’L UNIV., http://swgdog.fiu.edu/ (last visited May 2, 2017).
199. Id.
200. Telephone Interview with Chad Larner, Training Director, Macon County Sherriff’s 0ffice MAan. 86K 8G93L. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-23-140 (2017) (providing that the
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follows the guidelines modeled after SWGDOG and it must meet the requirements as established by the ILETSB.201 Not all canines are allowed to participate in the training program; they go through a special screening process in
order to determine if they are capable of passing the program with a high
success rate.202 Once they have gone through the initial screening process,
they are then subjected to a training program that requires them to detect
;mari:uanaHhashishK cocaineK heroin/opiate derivatives and methamphetamine..203 In order to pass the certification requirements to satisfy the Act, the
canine must demonstrate a 90% accuracy rate, according to the training facility that com(orts Qith B?FT/!’s re'uirements.204 The guidelines also
mandate a ;maintenance training. standardK Qhich requires that the canines
complete sixteen-hours of training per month; however the Macon County
training facility doubles that standard<they require that their canines undergo routine training thirty-two-hours per month to maintain canine accuracy.205
The Illinois legislature has set standards for narcotic detection canines
at a respectable 90% accuracy rate by mandating minimal requirements modeled after SWGDOG; the end result shows that agencies can always seek to
improve their police dogs while simultaneously striving to achieve a uniform
standard. As the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the scope of canine sniffs of
automoRiles Ry im(osing a ;reasonaRle sus(icion. re'uirement in order to
prolong a stop,206 the /tates should also seek to safeguard their citiNens’
Fourth Amendment protections by imposing minimal standards, similar to
Bllinois’s re'uirementsK that canines must meet in order to Re considered cerI
tified. This will help increase uniformity within state lines, as well as provide
a mechanism as to how each canine can be assessed in terms of training and
accuracy rates.

/outh Carolina Austice "cademy shall verify that (olice canines Qere certified from a ;nationI
ally recogniNed. (olice dog association); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 3311 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 244 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 56th Legis. (2017)) (providing that the Council
on Law Enforcement Education and Training is authorized and directed to certify teams<the
statute does not prescribe the requirements canines must meet).
201. Telephone Interview with Chad Larner, supra note 200.
202. Telephone Interview with Chad Larner, supra note 200.
203. Narcotic Detection Canine Minimum Certification Requirements, supra note 152,
at 1.
204. Narcotic Detection Canine Minimum Certification Requirements, supra note 152,
at 1.
205. Telephone Interview with Chad Larner, supra note 200.
206. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).
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LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA AND NARCOTIC
DETECTION DOGS

As if the uncertainties surrounding canine sniffs combined with the immense flexibility officers are awarded with the probable cause standard were
not enough, the U.S. is now faced with an additional mystery: How can a
narcotic-detecting canine that has been trained to detect marijuana alert to
illegal narcotics with the growing legalization of marijuana across the states?
Remember, even the most perfectly trained canine with a 100% accuracy rate
is unable to indicate to its handler which substance they have detected.207 The
problem lies in the scenario where a person is in possession of a legal amount
of marijuana, one ounce for example, and the canine that is instructed to sniff
the vehicle gives an alert to its handler. But the canine is unable to signal to
the handler that he is either alerting to a) the legal amount of marijuana, b)
an illegal amount of marijuana in the car, or c) another illegal substance. Colorado seemed to tackle this very issue in a decision where the Colorado Supreme Court held that the odor of marijuana is relevant to a probable cause
determination even though the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana
is legal under Colorado law.208
In People v. Zuniga, a Colorado State Trooper with a canine unit
stopped a vehicle, and immediately upon approaching the vehicle smelled a
heavy odor of unburnt marijuana.209 He noted the extreme nervousness of the
two occupants, and then walked his canine around the outside of the vehicle
and the canine alerted near the trunk, where one pound of marijuana was
found, along with 12.6 ounces of marijuana concentrate.210 The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that although one ounce of marijuana is legal under
Colorado law, there is a substantial amount of marijuana-related activities
that are criminal.211 Thus, the odor of marijuana plays an important role in
the ;totality of the circumstances. a((roach Qhen assessing (roRaRle
cause.212 Dissenting Justice Hood expressed his concerns with the decision
on the basis that allowing the odor of marijuana in conjunction with its legality in certain amounts would open the door to searches based on legal and
innocent activity.213 There, he wrote the majority’s conclusion that ;the alert
-suggested that illegal drugs Qere (resent in the vehicle’ goes too far . . . the
alert was consistent with the presence of illegal drugs just as it was consistent
with their absence..214 In other words, the alert could have been consistent
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 5.
People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Colo. 2016).
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
See Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1063-64.
Id.
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with the presence of illegal drugs (perhaps a pound of cocaine), just as it
would have been consistent with the absence of illegal drugs (had the canine
only alerted to a legal amount of marijuana).
Since canines cannot be trained to distinguish between the scent of an
ounce of marijuana and 1.25 ounces of marijuana, the solution to this canine
conundrum is elusive. Police agencies may be able to only train canines to
detect substances other than marijuana, like cocaine, methamphetamine, etc.,
but that would eliminate the possibility for detecting illegal amounts of marijuana. Teaching an old dog the new trick of ignoring the scent of marijuana
may prove to be just as difficult, if not impossible. As the underlying law
surrounding illegal substance will continue to change, so will police practice.215

V.

CONCLUSION

As the law currently stands, canines are allowed to sniff an automobile
Qithout the driver’s consentK and if the canine alerts to his handler that contraband is present, officers have probable cause to search the vehicle.216 But
the varying rates of canine accuracy and a lack of certification standards prescribed by the states and federal government gives rise to the doubts casted
u(on a canine’s infallibility. A remedy for this problem can be found in requiring police officers to have an articulable, individualized suspicion that a
vehicle contains contraband prior to instructing a canine to sniff a vehicle.
Additionally, states can also seek to establish uniformity in canine certification by enacting legislation that explicitly mandates an accuracy rate of 90%
or higher, like Illinois, for example. This would create a meaningful way to
assess a canine’s reliaRility in a Qay Qhere the current (ractice is lacking.

215. See generally Jennifer Oldham, Colorado K-9s Need New Tricks as Pot Law Muzzles Sniffers, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-14/colorado-k-9s-need-new-tricks-as-pot-law-muzzles-sniffers.
216. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).

